with Archibald criticized Bartholomew because he… (he=Bartholomew). While it is clear that meaning plays a critical role, it is unclear whether that meaning is directly encoded in the verb or, alternatively, inferred from world knowledge. We report evidence favoring the former account. We elicited pronoun biases for 502 verbs from seven Levin verb classes in two discourse contexts (implicit causality and implicit consequentiality), showing that in both contexts, verb class reliably predicts pronoun bias. These results confirm and extend recent findings about implicit causality and represent the first such study for implicit consequentiality. We discuss these findings in the context of recent work in semantics, and also develop a new, probabilistic generative account of pronoun interpretation.
In the early 1970s, Catherine Garvey and Alfonso Caramazza made an intriguing discovery: By changing the verb in one clause, they could radically change the interpretation of a pronoun in a subsequent clause Garvey, Caramazza, & Yates, 1974) .
(1) a. Archibald angered Bartholomew because he was reckless. b. Archibald criticized Bartholomew because he was reckless.
Most individuals interpret he as referring to Archibald in (1a) and Bartholomew in (1b).
Subsequent investigation revealed that this effect of the verb is independent of the content of the second clause: (2) a. Archibald angered Bartholomew because he... b. Archibald criticized Bartholomew because he...
Importantly, this effect is a bias that can be overcome if it conflicts with material that comes after the pronoun (Archibald angered Bartholomew because he is irritable), albeit with a significant processing cost .
Numerous verbs have been identified that bias listeners to resolve the pronoun to the previous subject (e.g., anger, delight, dare, trick) , whereas many others bias listeners to resolve the pronoun to the previous object (e.g., criticize, judge, love, hate) . Garvey and Caramazza, who dubbed this phenomenon "implicit causality," took it to indicate listeners' beliefs about causation: Listeners interpret the pronouns as they do because they understand Archibald to be the implicit cause of Archibald angered Bartholomew but understand Bartholomew to be the implicit cause of Archibald criticized Bartholomew. 1 1 Note that "implicit causality" is also used to refer to a task in which people make inferences about various attributes of individuals based on events they have participated in (Brown & Fish, 1983a) . Though initially thought to be related, subsequent research has Implicit causality is not the only phenomenon in which pronoun interpretation is biased. In sentences where the second clause describes a consequence of the first, a similar effect, known as "implicit consequentiality," arises (Au, 1986; Crinean & Garnham, 2006; Pickering & Majid, 2007; Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994; Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford 1998) :
(3) a. Because Archibald angered Bartholomew, he… [he=Bartholomew] b. Because Archibald liked Bartholomew, he… [he=Archibald] Again, some verbs bias pronoun interpretation towards the object (e.g., anger, delight) and others towards the subject (e.g., like, hate). Here, the relevant semantic distinction appears to be that one of the participants in the event is understood to have been more affected by the event, and thus is more likely to feature in consequences of the event. Note that the direction of a verb's bias is not necessarily the same as for implicit causality.
Although implicit causality and consequentiality were initially described as pronoun interpretation biases, recent empirical and theoretical results suggest that these biases are manifestations of a broader expectation about who will be mentioned next in some discourse (cf. Arnold, 2001; Arnold, Brown--Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2007; Kehler, 2002; Kehler, Kertz, Rohde, & Elman, 2008) . 2 If the next noun phrase is a pronoun, this expectation will color the interpretation of that pronoun (pronoun--specific interpretation strategies may still apply). Support for this position comes from studies where participants provide continuations to sentences truncated before the pronoun (Archibald angered found little or no relationship between the two kinds of implicit causality (Hartshorne, 2014) . All discussion of implicit causality in the present paper pertains to the original Garvey and Caramazza phenomenon. 2 An alternative is that these biases are in fact learned heuristics derived from the statistics of pronoun use itself, which are used to predict the likely reference of a pronoun (Crawley et al., 1990; Fletcher, 1984) . We return to this account in the General Discussion.
Bartholomew because…), and researchers record who is mentioned in the continuation. The likelihood that the continuation provided by participants will mention a particular character correlates at ceiling rates with pronoun interpretation biases for equivalent sentences Hartshorne, 2014; Kehler et al., 2008) . We will use the more general term re--mention bias to refer collectively to both production and interpretation biases, whether involving pronouns or other referring expressions (cf. Hartshorne, 2014) .
Note that while implicit causality and consequentiality are the most frequently discussed re--mention biases -and are the focus of this paper -they are likely just two examples of a broader phenomenon: There is some indication that verbs also have systematic effects in sentences connected by and, but, and other connectives (Erlich, 1980; Koornneef & Sanders, 2013; Featherstone & Sturt, 2010; Rigalleau, Guerry, & Granjon, in press; Stevenson, Knott, Oberlander, & McDonald, 2000) . As research goes forward, it will be important to determine which results generalize to the broader class of phenomena.
World Knowledge or Language?
Most researchers agree that intuitions about the causes and effects of events drive implicit causality and consequentiality biases. An open question -and the focus of the present study -is what information underlies these intuitions.
Many researchers have argued that these intuitions must be partly or entirely inferred from general knowledge about the typical causes and effects of different kinds of events (Brown & Fish, 1983a , 1983b Corrigan, 2001 Corrigan, , 2002 Corrigan, , 2003 Pickering & Majid, 2007; Semin & Fiedler, 1991 (Au, 1986) , the stability of these beliefs across cultures (Brown & Fish, 1983a) , and people's expectations about gender roles (Ferstl, Garnham, & Manouilidou, 2011; Goikoetxea, Pascual, & Acha, 2008; Mannetti & de Grada, 1991) .
The alternative semantic structure account is that causes and consequences are not implicit but are actually part of the literal meaning of the verb (Arnold, 2001; Brown & Fish, 1983b; Crinean & Garnham, 2006; Hartshorne & Snedeker, 2013; Rudolph & Forsterling, 1997; Stevenson et al., 2000) . 3 suggested that verbs mark their subject or object (or neither) as the cause of the event.
Subsequent researchers tried to reduce this "implicit cause" feature to aspects of verb lexical semantics, such as thematic roles (see especially Brown & Fish, 1983b; Crinean & Garnham, 2006 ). An action verb (kick, paint, break, throw) involves an AGENT (the subject) 3 As indicated in the citations, Brown & Fish (1983b) have been influential in the development of both positions and can be read as supporting either one.
effecting some change on the PATIENT (the object). Because AGENTS are by definition causal actors and PATIENTs by definition suffer some consequence as the result of the event, such verbs should be subject--biased in implicit causality and object--biased in implicit consequentiality. Thus, on this account, re--mention biases are not probes into people's knowledge about the world in a language--independent manner but rather are probes into the semantic representations underlying basic linguistic processes. As such, the causality and consequentiality, etc., in verbs is not so much implicit as explicit (hence the title of this paper).
Thus while the world knowledge account predicts that changing facts about the world changes the IC bias of a verb, on the semantic structure account, facts about the world are relevant only in that they cause speakers to coin and use verbs that encode specific information about causality and affectedness.
Two lines of evidence have been used to distinguish these accounts. Until recently, both favored the world knowledge account. First, preliminary evidence suggested that re--mention biases were affected by not just the verb but also knowledge about the actors (i.e.,
Archibald's and Bartholomew's genders, occupations, relative social status, etc.), supporting the conclusion that re--mention biases are calculated over a rich representation of the event that incorporates substantial knowledge about the world (cf. Pickering & Majid, 2007) . However, the preliminary evidence that these additional factors modulated re--mention biases largely failed to hold up under more systematic investigation (Goikoetxea et al., 2008; Hartshorne, 2014; see also Ferstl et al., 2011) .
Second, proponents of the semantic structure account have long had difficulty in finding a semantic characterization of verbs that correctly predicts re--mention biases (for review, see Hartshorne & Snedeker, 2013) . For instance, on early accounts, agent--patient verbs were predicted to be subject--biased in implicit causality sentences, whereas in fact many are object--biased (e.g., criticize). This lead researchers to posit a new semantic role (EVOCATOR), which was circularly defined as a PATIENT that nonetheless attracts implicit causality bias (Au, 1986; Rudolph & Forsterling, 1997) . The failure to formulate an accurate predictive theory has been seen as a challenge to the semantic structure account. Here, too, more recent evidence has begun challenge this conclusion, as we discuss in the following section.
Before discussing this evidence, we note one potential liability for the world knowledge account. Numerous studies have now shown that at least in some cases implicit causality bias can affect pronoun interpretation within about half a second of encountering the pronoun, if not earlier (Cozijn, Commandeur, Vonk, & Noordman, 2011; Featherstone & Sturt, 2010; Koornneef & Sanders, 2012; Koornneef & van Berkum, 2006; Pyykkonen & Jarvikivi, 2010) . This raises the question of whether this is sufficient time for complex inferences based on unconstrained amounts of world knowledge. In contrast, it has long been established that listeners can use the lexical semantics of verbs to predict upcoming words within a few hundred milliseconds of encountering the verb (Altmann & Kamide, 1999) . 4
Finer--Grained Semantic Representations
Hartshorne and Snedeker (2013) -henceforth H&S -provided new evidence that semantic structure drives implicit causality. They noted that contemporary work in verb semantics has found it necessary to invoke much richer, finer--grained semantic representations than those considered in the re--mention literature. For instance, Crinean and Garnham (2006) invoke only 5 semantic roles, whereas contemporary semantic role theories may have several dozen (Kipper, Korhonen, Ryant, & Palmer, 2006; Schuler, 2005;  for review, see Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005) . Many theorists have also argued that treating semantic roles as primitives (as is done in the re--mention literature) results in too brittle a theory, and they have argued for more articulated representations (for review, see Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005) . Thus, since semantic structure accounts have invoked primitive semantic roles that are too coarse--grained, it is perhaps not surprising that they over--generalized. H&S also noted that all contemporary theories of verb semantics incorporate notions of causation and affectedness as core components of meaning; it would be surprising if these did not play a role in implicit causality and consequentiality, respectively.
How to best characterize verb meanings remains an area of active research (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 2005) . H&S abstracted away from specific proposals by focusing on the verb classes provided in the comprehensive and authoritative classification of Levin (1993) , as modified and extended in VerbNet (Kipper et al, 2006; Schuler, 2005 (Ambridge, Pine, Rowland, Jones, & Clark, 2009; Croft, 2012; Goldberg, 2003; Jackendoff, 1990; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005; Pinker, 1989; Tenny & Pustejovsky, 2000; inter alia) . 5 Thus, H&S asked whether verbs in the same syntactic class would share the same implicit causality bias. If so, that suggests that the same underlying semantic structure that drives Levin verb classes also drives re--mention biases. H&S focused on five verb classes, finding just such a pattern (Figure 1 ). Moreover, which classes were biased in which direction matched previous suggestions as to how causality is (or is not) encoded by verbs in those classes. Figure 1 . Pronoun interpretation biases in explanatory ("implicit causality") sentences (e.g., 2--4) for the five verb classes (identified by VerbNet class number 6 ) investigated in Hartshorne and Snedeker (2013) , plotted by verb. For verbs that were tested in both Exp. 1 5 For instance, the reason that both Agnes broke the vase and The vase broke are grammatical but Beatrice hit the vase is grammatical while *The vase hit is not is that break describes an externally caused event, whereas hit does not (cf. Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005) . 6 Because most classes do not lend themselves to intuitive names, these classes are numbered. Throughout, we use the VerbNet numbers and give examples.
Empirical Log-Odds of Choosing Subject verbs (N=9) were object--biased, with the one exception (honor) being only slightly subject--biased.
Second, of the five syntactic classes investigated by H&S, only two were tested exhaustively, with only a sample of verbs tested in the other three classes. In this study, we exhaustively test implicit causality and consequentiality biases for seven verb classesincluding the five for which H&S investigated implicit causality bias.
Finally, as noted by both Rudolph and Forsterling (1997) and H&S, there has been a tendency in the re--mention literature to focus on a small set of about four dozen verbs drawn from and Brown and Fish (1983b) , resulting in theories being overfit to this narrow sample. In the case of implicit causality, this issue has lately been ameliorated by the publication of several large datasets involving hundreds of verbs (Ferstl et al., 2011; Goikoetxea et al., 2008; Hartshorne & Snedeker, 2013) . Nevertheless, this remains an issue for implicit consequentiality. To address this issue, we report implicit consequentiality biases for 502 verbs.
Experiment
We tested implicit causality and consequentiality biases for a comprehensive sample of verbs in each of seven syntactic classes (Table 1 ). These were the five classes tested by Hartshorne and Snedeker (2013) , plus two additional classes (31.3 and 31.4), which consist of the emotion verbs 7 that take indirect objects rather than direct objects (classes 31.1 and 31.2). Classes 31.1 (amuse), 31.2 (admire), and 33 (acclaim) are three classes of verbs frequently discussed in the re--mention bias literature: experiencer--object emotion verbs, experiencer--subject emotion verbs, and judgment verbs (cf. Crinean & Garnham, 2006; Hartshorne & Snedeker, 2013; Rudolph & Forsterling, 1997) .
Note that our present focus is whether the class of each verb predicts its re--mention bias. In the General Discussion, we discuss the results in terms of current theories of verb semantics.
Method
Subjects 1,638 native English--speaking volunteers (ages 18--81, M=32, SD=14; 991 female) who reported no history of dyslexia or psychiatric disorders and who were aged 18 to 81 completed the experiment through the Web portal gameswithwords.org. Children under 18 7 In the psycholinguistic literature, emotion verbs have often been grouped together with propositional attitude verbs (think, believe) and education verbs (teach, learn). Collectively, these verbs are known as "psych verbs". Because these verbs appear in distinct verb classes, we discuss them separately. Moreover, H&S found little evidence that these different types of psych verbs pattern similarly with regards to re--mention biases.
were excluded because they potentially do not know low--frequency words. Two participants aged 96 and 100 were excluded for having implausible ages. An additional 201 participants were excluded for missing more than one of the control questions (see below).
Varying the exclusion criteria had little effect on the results.
Materials and Procedure
An archived version of the experiment may be viewed at www.gameswithwords.org/PronounSleuth. Each participant judged fourteen implicit causality sentences (4) and fourteen implicit consequentiality sentences (5). For each participant, the order of the sentence types was randomized.
(4) Sally VERBed Mary because she daxed.
(5) Because Sally VERBed Mary, she daxed.
Participants were asked "Who do you think daxed?" and asked to choose the subject (Sally) or the object (Mary). In order to account for any bias to choose the name based on position (left or right), the order of the clickable options was randomized on each trial.
The names of the characters (Sally, Mary) and the novel verb (daxed, gorped) were sampled without replacement from a set of 70 common and unambiguously female names chosen from the (USA) Social Security Administration database and 32 novel verbs, respectively. Participants were told that some real words had been replaced with novel words (e.g., daxed) in order to make the task more challenging; this manipulation was intended to ensure that sentence content after the pronoun could have little effect on pronoun interpretation (cf Hartshorne & Snedeker, 2013; Hartshorne, Sudo & Uruwashi, 2013) . The use of randomly--chosen common names had a similar purpose.
Each participant was thus tested on 28 verbs, which were chosen randomly without replacement from the total set of 502. These represented nearly all the verbs in seven VerbNet classes (see Table 1 ), excluding those which can appear in another class as a simple transitive with two animate arguments and thus are polysemous. One class 31.1 verb (dumbfounded) was misspelled and thus is excluded from analyses. Examples of each class are given in Table 1 .
Because we aimed for an exhaustive test of the semantic--structure hypothesis, we included all relevant verbs. However, we note that some of the verbs were only marginally acceptable in the transitive construction (Archibald coaxed Bill). Because we presented the verbs in transitive sentences, this lower acceptability could result in participants having weaker intuitions about these sentences, increasing noise. Note that this should work against our hypothesis, attenuating any relationship between verb class re--mention bias.
Any evidence we find of such a relationship would be that much more compelling. 8 Four catch trials were included where the pronoun was disambiguated by gender (e.g., Sally thanked John because he daxed). Participants who made more than one error on these catch trials were excluded. (Kipper et al., 2006) , an extension of the original work by Levin (1993) .
Results

Description of analyses
Each verb was judged in an average of 40 implicit causality and 40 implicit consequentiality sentences (Range=24--69, SD=7). Because generalization across items is of primary interest, and because the nature of the data collection does not readily permit by--subjects analyses, analyses below are conducted by item only. Although re--mention biases are usually reported in terms of the percentage of participants resolving the pronoun to the previous subject, the use of this non--linear scale Implicit Consequentiality. Across verbs, we observed a wide range of implicit consequentiality biases, with a slight overall object bias ( Figure 2) . However, as shown in Figure 3 , these biases were a systematic function of verb class. All seven classes showed a significant bias in two--tailed t-- 
Empirical Log-Odds of Choosing Subject All classes showed significant biases (ps<.001) with the exception of 31.1 and 31.4 (ps>.1). The only non--significant pairwise comparisons between classes, after Sidak
Empirical Log-Odds of Choosing Subject 
Combined Analysis
We followed up the above analyses by quantifying how much information verb class provides about the bias of a given verb. We fit the raw data to a hierarchical logistic regression with discourse type (causality or consequentiality) as a fixed effect, and with random intercepts and slopes for each verb. The standard deviation of the random intercepts (1.18) and slopes (1.62) quantifies uncertainty about verb bias if all one knows is the discourse type of the sentence. Adding a fixed effect of verb class greatly reduced this uncertainty (SDs = 0.70, 0.79, respectively; ps < .001), indicating that verb class is highly
Empirical Log-Odds of Choosing Subject These results are predicted by the semantic structure account, on which the semantic information responsible for re--mention biases is read off the linguistic signal itself, rather than being inferred from general knowledge about the world. On this view, implicit causality and consequentiality are quite explicit in language.
The world knowledge account was formulated to explain how people infer the causes and consequences of linguistically--encoded events (e.g., Archibald angered Bartholomew). However, linguistic meaning appears to be sufficient to explain much of the phenomenon, and it is not currently clear whether world knowledge plays any additional role. Further development of the world knowledge account would require meeting three challenges. First, one would need to explain why listeners infer causality and affectedness from world knowledge rather than simply using the information about causality and 11 We assessed significance with a permutation analysis: We randomly reassigned verbs to verb class with the constraint that the number of verbs in each class remain the same, and then refit the model. We repeated this process 1,000 times. In all 1,000 iterations, the standard deviation of the random intercepts and slopes was much greater than the true model, never dropping below 1.15 and 1.58, respectively. affectedness conveyed by the verb. Second, one would need to actually show that people's (nonlinguistic) beliefs about the likely causes and results actually predict re--mention bias, a core prediction that surprisingly has not yet been tested. Finally, one would need to show that world knowledge--based inferences could be calculated quickly enough to match the speed with which re--mention biases appear online (cf. Koornneef & van Berkum, 2006, inter alia) .
Note that despite the role of verb semantics, re--mention biases remain a pragmatic inference, albeit a semantically--derived one. For convenience, researchers often refer to the cause of an event, though in fact any event has multiple causes and thus can be explained in multiple ways; at best, listeners can only make reasonable guesses as to what cause is most likely to be discussed (cf. Pickering & Majid, 2007) . 12 The fact that listeners expect explanations to refer to the cause highlighted by the verb and consequences to refer to the entity marked as affected by the verb remains an inference and is sometimes incorrect (Caramazza et al., 1977) .
Our conclusions here might seem a disappointment to those who see re--mention biases as an example of complex world knowledge inferences rapidly guiding sentence processing. However, this does not make re--mention biases less interesting. To the contrary, re--mention biases highlight the communicative power of language: Rather than requiring listeners to infer causes and consequences using general reasoning skills, language specifies (some of the) causes and consequences of events. An interesting 12 Causes of an event (Archibald angered Bartholomew) include both the power of the agent to realize some effect (causing anger) and the liability of the patient to be affected (the ability to be angry) (cf. White, 1989) . Moreover, there are proximate causes (Archibald punching Bartholomew in the nose) and prior causes (Archibald's troubled upbringing, which made him violent).
question for future research is whether speakers strategically choose which verb to use to describe an event based on what aspects of event structure they wish to highlight.
In the remainder of this section, we address three issues. First, we address the fact that we observed stronger object biases in implicit causality in the present experiment than did H&S. Second, we discuss the re--mention biases observed for different verb classes in the context of prior semantics research. Finally, we address the question of why and how listeners make use of semantics to guide re--mention biases.
The Object Shift
Overall, in the present study the implicit causality biases were shifted in the 
novel verb (Sally frightened Mary because she daxed).
In a follow--up experiment, we ruled out a role for tense. Forty--eight native English speakers (26 female; 18--58 y.o., M=33, SD=11) were presented with 20 randomly--selected monosemic verbs from class 59 in explanation discourses truncated after the connective because (John cheated Mary because…) and were asked to decide whether the next word should be he or she. 13 13 The study was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and participants received monetary compensation. An additional five participants were excluded for answering all four unambiguous filler trials incorrectly, nine were excluded for failing to answer every As Figure 6 shows, tense had little effect: In contrast with our results above but similar to those of H&S, the overall results were numerically subject--biased regardless of tense. We confirmed this result with a binomial mixed effects model, which found no effect of tense (Wald's z<1). 14 Although the numeric subject bias did not reach significance (Wald's z=1.5, p=.14), verbs in this task were significantly more subject--biased than in the main experiment, whether treating each tense separately or combining across them (ps<.00001). Figure 6 . Results of the follow--up experiment. Boxplots of implicit causality biases for class 59, in present and past tense.
Since tense cannot explain the object shift, we suspect that the culprit was our use of a novel verb in the sentence continuation, rather than a novel noun. It is long established that content after the pronoun can result in reinterpretation of the pronoun (Archibald question, and three were excluded for not being native English speakers. Whether the subject was male and the object was female or vice versa was counter--balanced within and between participants. Two orders of stimuli were used, one of which was the reverse of the other. Half the participants saw the verbs in present tense, half in past tense. 14 Participants and verbs were random effects, while tense and whether the male character was the subject or object were fixed effects (the latter was also non--significant, Wald's z=1.65, p=.10). Maximal random effects structure was used.
Empirical Log-Odds of Choosing Subject present past angered Bartholomew because he was reckless/irritable), though with some processing cost (Caramazza et al., 1977) . Because the focus in the re--mention literature has been the early re--mention biases rather than these post--pronoun revision processes, most studies are designed to minimize the effect of content after the pronoun. This is true of both our study and that of H&S: The novel nouns (H&S) and verbs (present study) were meant to provide content--free continuations that would not affect pronoun interpretation and thus would provide a clean assay of the verb--and connective--driven re--mention biases.
However, explanations involving predicate nouns (because he is a dax) and explanations involving verbs (because he daxed) are not semantically equivalent. The former suggest a stable property of one of the event--participants (he is a swimmer/psychologist/shouter/etc.), whereas the latter suggest an event or state (he shouted/fell/died/etc.). The data suggest that knowing that the explanation involves a stable trait did not affect people's intuitions about who the explanation referred to; implicit causality biases elicited using novel nouns correlate at ceiling rates with those elicited in sentence continuation experiments in which there is no material after the pronoun (Hartshorne, 2014) . In contrast, it appears that people are much more likely to ascribe explanations involving an action or state to object of the antecedent. Further research is necessary to determine why this is the case.
Kinds of Causes & Kinds of Explanations
On most semantic analyses (e.g., Kipper et al., 2006) , verbs in classes 31.1 (amuse), 31.4 (appeal to), 33 (acclaim), 45.4 (age), and 59 (coax) mark their objects as affected, explaining why these verbs are object--biased in implicit consequentiality. In contrast, the subject of the verbs in classes 31.2 (admire) and 31.3 (agonize over) is the experiencer of a mental state and thus most affected by the situation, accounting for their implicit consequentiality subject biases. Likewise, several previous semantic analyses have suggested that the verbs in classes 31.1 (amuse) and 31.4 (appeal to) highlight the causal role of their subjects whereas the verbs in classes 31.2 (admire), 31.3 (agonize over), and 33 highlight the causal role of their object, consistent with the observed implicit causality biases, modulo the object shift discussed in the previous section (cf. Kipper et al., 2006; McKoon, Greene, & Ratcliff, 1993) . Interpreting the implicit causality findings for the verbs in classes 45.4 (age) and 59
(coax) is more complex, in part because these verbs have not been extensively studied.
Intuitively, the subjects of these verbs are causal agents, and indeed the semantic structures provided by VerbNet highlights the causal role of their subjects. Consistent with this analysis, H&S find a slight but significant implicit causality subject--bias for these verbs relative to the grand mean across verbs. This matches what we found in our follow--up experiment on class 59 in the previous section (the overall object shift in our main experiment makes that experiment less informative for this issue). However, this subject bias is much weaker than the one observed for classes 31.1 (amuse) and 31.4 (appeal to).
While this finding is perfectly consistent with our broader conclusion that re--mention biases are a systematic function of verb class, it is intriguing. We consider possible explanations below. One interesting possibility, highlighted in recent work by Bott and Solstad (in press ), is that different verb classes may encode different kinds of causes (see also Bittner & Dery, 2014 
Towards a Generative Account of Re--mention Biases
While evidence for the semantic structure account is not yet conclusive -there are more verb classes to be tested in more discourse contexts (e.g., sentences involving and, but, or although), and independently--verified semantic analyses are needed in many cases -the above results, coupled with previous work, are highly promising (cf. Arnold2001; Crinean and Garnham, 2006; Hartshorne, 2014; Hartshorne & Snedeker, 2013) . This leaves open a deep question about re--mention biases that has received too little attention: How and why do listeners draw on semantic information to interpret pronouns in the first place? Three possibilities have been explored in some detail. A number of researchers explained implicit causality biases by arguing that causes are salient (Garnham, Traxler, Oakhill, & Gernsbacher, 1996; McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; Song & Fisher, 2005) , assimilating the phenomenon into earlier theories on which pronouns refer to the most salient antecedent (Evans, 1980; Fletcher, 1984; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Song & Fisher, 2005 van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; van Rij, van Rij, & Hendriks, 2013) . This account suffers in that it fails to explain implicit consequentiality. Moreover, it has proven difficult to establish that causes really are salient (cf. Garnham et al., 1996; McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995) .
Other researchers have suggested that re--mention biases arise from heuristics learned from the statistics of pronoun use: People learn that in certain contexts, pronouns usually refer to the previous cause, whereas in other contexts, pronouns usually refer to the previous affected entity, etc. (Crawley et al., 1990; Fletcher, 1984 ; see also Stevenson et al., 1994) . Some support for this possibility comes from that fact that even infants can learn arbitrary statistical predictors of upcoming components of the speech stream (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) .
While the flexibility of this approach has some appeal, it risks presupposing the solution to the problem it is meant to solve. Third--person pronouns are always potentially ambiguous. In principle, the he in Archibald frightens Bartholomew because he is scary could refer to Archibald, Bartholomew, or any other male entity. Heuristics are invoked to explain how people nonetheless converge on an interpretation. But is difficult to see how we can use heuristics to determine pronoun reference if we must use pronoun reference to learn the heuristics in the first place.
A third, related account avoids this circularity is the expectancy hypothesis (Arnold, 1998 (Arnold, , 2001 Arnold et al., 2007) . Listeners learn features of the input that predict what will be mentioned next. These expectations can be learned from cases in which reference was unambiguous (Archibald frightens Bartholomew because Archibald is scary) and then generalized to sentences involving prepositions.
Arnold and colleagues have discussed two ways in which these expectations might be built. One is that listeners may learn heuristics from statistical correlations between features of the speech stream and subsequent referents (Arnold et al., 2007, p. 531) . In this, the expectancy hypothesis operates much like the heuristics account described above, except that heuristics predict next--mention rather than pronoun reference per se. One potential limitation of this approach is that the relationship between causes and explanations and the relationship between affected entities and consequences is left unmotivated. People learn this relationship because it is a feature of the input. However, if the statistics of the input justified it, they should be just as happy to learn that explanations usually refer to the affected entity rather than the cause. One might wonder whether rote statistical learning is necessary to learn principled, motivated relationship such as the one between causation and explanation.
Arnold and colleagues also mention an alternative: Listeners use features of the discourse to build rich models of the speaker's intentions and goals, using this to generate expectations about what the speaker might refer to next (Arnold et al., 2007, p. 532) .
Although intriguing, no further detail is provided about the nature of these models, how the input is used to construct the models, or how inferences are derived from the models.
Building on the insights of the expectancy hypothesis as well as work by Kehler and colleagues (Kehler, 2002; Kehler et al., 2008) and Sagi and Rips (in press), we introduce the most probable message (MPM) account. On the MPM account, re--mention biases are a manifestation of a much broader account of language comprehension. Listeners have an intuitive model of the generative 15 processes that give rise to speaker behavior: What the speaker says depends on the speaker's goals, intentions, knowledge state, and -most importantly -what message the speaker wishes to convey. In this, we build on recent computational models of pragmatics (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmuller, 2013) which are themselves rooted in earlier observations by Grice (1989) .
Like many current theories, MPM assumes incremental, predictive processing (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Arnold et al., 2001; Arnold et al., 2007; Huang & Snedeker, 2011; Levy, 2008; Kutas, DeLong, & Smith, 2011; Snedeker, 2009; Tanenhaus, Spivey--Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; van Berkum, 2008) . In particular, the listener tries to infer the speaker's message based on whatever information is currently available, which may be less than the entire utterance.
For the moment, though, we consider how the MPM account handles pronouns in the context of complete sentences. We return to predictive re--mention biases later.
Focusing just on the pronoun, the problem is to determine its intended reference in sentences like (6), which reduces to determining which sentence in (7) has the same meaning as (6): (6) Archibald angered Bartholomew because he is reckless.
(7) a. Archibald angered Bartholomew because Archibald is reckless.
b. Archibald frightened Bartholomew because Bartholomew is reckless.
c. Archibald frightened Bartholomew because Cameron is reckless.
d. Archibald frightened Bartholomew because Dionysus is reckless.
Etc.
As noted by Kehler et al. (2008) , the probability the speaker meant (7a), for instance, is proportional to the probability that she would say (6) given that she meant (7a) times the probability that she wanted to communicate (7a) in the first place. That is, following Bayes' rule:
Note that speakers typically only use pronouns to refer to a recently--mention entity. As a result, the probability of uttering (6) -which has a pronoun -when intending to convey (7c) or (7d), etc., is very low, since Cameron and Dionysus, etc., have not been mentioned previously. By equation (8), (6) is unlikely to mean anything other than (7a) or (7b), as desired. It remains to explain why (7a) is preferred to (7b). Again, expectations about the speaker's behavior play a critical role. By hypothesis, the probability that the speaker would want to convey a particular message depends on whether that message is true, whether the speaker knows it is true, and what the speaker is motivated to communicate (Grice, 1989) . Note that in all the examples described in this paper, we know nothing about the speaker's intentions or her knowledge of the world. We do, however, know what is likely to be true: Archibald being reckless is much more likely to result in Archibald angering Bartholomew than is Bartholomew being reckless, and so the speaker is more likely a priori to want to convey (7a) than (7b). Thus, by equation (8), the most likely interpretation of (6) is (7a), as desired. A similar analysis applies straightforwardly to implicit consequentiality sentences. Archibald angered Bartholomew so he plotted revenge most likely refers to Bartholomew plotting revenge because that results in an interpretation of the sentence that is more likely to actually be true of the world. 16 Note that this captures the widely--shared intuition that linguistic ambiguity is often resolved in favor of the more plausible interpretation (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Garnsey, Pearlmutter, Myers, & Lotocky, 1997; Grice, 1989; Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, & Martin, 1993; McRae, Spivey--Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998 ). Now we turn to verb bias -the topic of the present work. Again, we would like to know which interpretation of a pronoun (10) is meant to be conveyed by some sentence (9). particularly since listeners can calculate implicit causality biases within a few hundred 16 We are indebted to Sagi & Rips (in press ) for the suggestion of using the probabilities of the events themselves. Among the many differences between our approach and theirs is that rather than invoking Gricean reasoning, Sagi & Rips embed their theory in the notion of causal identity: What makes he in likely to refer to Archibald in (6) is the fact that he and Archibald are likely to be causally related. We are currently attempting to tease apart these two accounts in ongoing research.
milliseconds of encountering the pronoun (Koornneef and van Berkum, 2006; Pyykkonen and Jarvikivi, 2010; inter alia Unlike salience accounts, it incorporates discourse structure. Unlike heuristic and expectancy accounts, re--mention biases are derived from the structure of language and thought rather than learned from correlations in the input. There is no explicit salience hierarchy or expectedness hierarchy; re--mention biases are not expectations about reference but rather manifestations of current beliefs about what the speaker is saying, based on the best available evidence. There is much left to be done to flesh out and test this account, a process currently underway (Hartshorne, O'Donnell, and Tenenbaum, in prep) .
However, we believe that it provides a potentially promising avenue for further research and consideration.
Conclusion
Above, we present data from 502 verbs, showing that implicit causality and consequentiality biases are a systematic function of Levin verb class. This represents by far the largest survey of implicit consequentiality biases to date, and thus these data should serve to test and constrain all theories. We argue that in particular these results support a theory on which the semantic information underlying re--mention biases is encoded in the structure of language, rather than inferred from general knowledge about the world. 
